Sex and the secular liberal

Conor Gearty

Misunderstanding the depth of post-socialist commitment to equality and diversity, especially that of sexual orientation, was a serious mistake in the Church's handling of the gay adoption issue, according to a leading Catholic human-rights lawyer

Might Cardinal Cormac Murphy- O'Connor and his episcopal brethren benefit from a board of lay Catholics to advise them on their contact with secular society? In the past week it has been disconcerting to read about the way the "gay adoption" issue seems to have been tackled by the Catholic Church in England and Wales, which made it clear to the Government that it could not accept equality regulations that would put same-sex couples on an equal footing with heterosexual couples as adoptive parents. In doing so the Church raised the stakes, with threats to close down adoption agencies if the Government enforced the requirement to accept the regulations.

The Church's stand left many questions to be answered. Are homosexual acts a "grave depravity", as the Vatican says, if within the context of a loving, monogamous relationship. And if so, why are the bishops so apparently relaxed about allowing referrals of such couples to other adoption agencies? Why did the Church make its threat to close the agencies so early in the dispute, thereby seeming to turn vulnerable children into weapons in the political battle?

None of these questions was satisfactorily answered. The politics of the campaign also seemed mismanaged, for the Church was seen to be taking on Education Secretary Alan Johnson, staunch supporter of the regulations, after so recently destroying his leadership ambitions by beating him on faith schools. This was particularly foolish: like a home-owner who has just been robbed, Johnson was especially vigilant so when the thieves returned for a second go he would be ready for them.

It also did not help that the cardinal felt able to write a letter to the Prime Minister and the entire Cabinet setting out "Catholic teaching about the foundations of family life" - something which non-Catholics less versed in the unreality that permeates so many of the Church's purer ethical positions might have misunderstood as an instruction to Government members of his flock to conform? Then there was the, to my mind, altogether more egregious warning issued by the Archbishop of Glasgow that the Scottish electorate would be urged to vote for the parties and candidates who are closest to the moral stance of the Church (i.e. not Labour).

These aspects of the adoption row obscured a very important point of principle under the surface, one which in a calmer discussion could have been brought usefully to the fore. The Labour Government's commitment to equality is genuine and has grown as more traditional socialist values have lost their persuasive edge. The Equality Act 2006 and the establishment of a new Equality Commission reflect this fact. The country is also now committed to human rights: the same Labour administration enacted the Human Rights Act in 1998 and the Equality Commission has "and Human Rights" tagged along in its title. Neither concept is unproblematic, however, and their interrelationship is more complex still.

The primary duties of the new Commission centre on working for "equality" and "diversity", the first being statutorily defined as "equality between individuals", the second as "the fact that individuals are different". Certain kinds of equality between individuals work well with the idea of diversity, and this human-rights aspect of the term frequently puts in an appearance in the act. The new commission must encourage and support the development of a society in which there is respect for "each individual's human rights", "for the dignity and worth of each individual" and for a place where "people's ability to achieve their potential is not limited by prejudice or discrimination". This is the brand of equality the act has in mind when it insists that there should be "mutual respect between groups based on understanding and valuing of diversity and on shared respect for equality and human rights".

This is a form of equality that celebrates difference. But another form of equality, rooted in the Act's origins as an anti-discrimination measure, is also prominent, and it is this that has caused the problems for the Catholic adoption agencies. It is about the avoidance of difference. There is plenty in the Act demanding that there should be no wrongful discrimination in this sense. It was by comparing a woman or a member of an ethnic community with how a similarly situated white man would be treated that society was able to work out when certain treatments were right and others wrong: the proscribed behaviour was that which treated the women/ethnic person differently/less well simply on account of their gender/ethnicity. The comparison was the benchmark of morality: how we treated him was how we should treat all.

This whole approach has attracted its share of criticism over the years, even in the fields for which it was specifically designed. It has caused trouble for positive discrimination: the favouring of members of a disempowered group so as to redress historic imbalances inevitably causes individuals in the powerful group unlucky enough to be born at the wrong time to be treated less well through no fault of their own.

Some critics argue that the very idea of a comparison is misplaced, driving us in the direction of an unattractive homogeneity, aping the powerful rather than working out what behaviour works for us (as an ethnic group, gender or, we might add, religious community). When a statute faces two ways, as the Equality Act does, it will be the responsibility of the new Commission to achieve a synthesis between the two, working out when difference is to be sought and when avoided, when it is right to merge into the majority and when to push to the front and assert individuality.

An answer to this conundrum is implicit in the legislation but it is only achievable if secular liberal society confronts a fact that it usually likes to avoid, namely that liberal ideals are not derived from some neutral perspective above society but that they constitute an ideology, staking out a position that is deeply embedded in politics and one which contains just as strong a sense of right and wrong as the "fundamentalists" (of all sorts) from whom it so confidently distinguishes itself.

The fact that this ideology is one of tolerance, mutual esteem and respect for diversity is why its imposition is not something of which its proponents are proud. But if liberals are truly committed to this perspective they need to be willing to recognise that they are being fundamentalist in exactly the way in which they often accuse others of being. The inevitable consequence is that the victims of this determination to impose mutuality of respect feel that they are being coerced, "forced to be free" as Rousseau might have put it.

Liberal society is leavened through with toughness: it has plenty of state powers to resist subversion from within as well as from without; it has a whole cohort of laws punishing hate speech and other kinds of unacceptable talk. It now has anti-discrimination laws to prohibit not all kinds of discrimination but rather only those that offend against its model of tolerance and broad-mindedness - like refusing to accept same-sex couples for adoption, for example. In the post-socialist age, non-faith-based progressives are deadly serious about imposing their liberalism, as the Catholic hierarchy has now found to its cost.

How should the Church react to the challenge of this liberal vision of society? It should recognise, first, that it is much better than the rampant capitalist world of competing selfish individuals that might otherwise be on view, and second, that it seeks a much better world than one in which all are allowed to discriminate to their heart's content. And finally, with one large exception, the liberal vision of society is very close to that of the Church, with progressives and Catholics being almost always on the same side on such key issues as esteem, dignity and opportunity for all. The one exception, the radically different approach taken to sexuality, is often more to the fore among the senior church leadership that it is on the ground at parish level.

The liberal vision of a tolerant society based on mutual respect but also on a rejection of intolerance is not one to be feared. Rather, it is an offer of partnership that the Church should joyfully seize. But first it has to work out how on earth to manoeuvre itself out of the cul-de-sac of sexuality into which its universality has forced it. Liberal society knows exactly where it is going; does the Church?

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