Church of England bishops stepped up their opposition to war on Iraq this week. In the United States the Catholic ethical and political theorist George Weigel has accused them and American bishops of failing to update the just war principles. The Anglican Bishop of Oxford takes issue

IN HIS press conference on Monday, Tony Blair underlined the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to British interests. But the question should still be pressed whether just war criteria have been met by the proposed military response to this threat. George Weigel, Senior Fellow of the Ethics and Public Policy Centre in Washington, has recently criticised Roman Catholic and Anglican bishops both in Britain and in the United States in their understanding of the just war tradition. The implication of his argument is that this tradition, properly understood, does justify military action against Saddam Hussein.

Weigel makes some important points, not least that the tradition is as relevant and applicable today as it ever was. More speci-fically, he argues first that it is the moral responsibility of duly constituted public authorities to make decisions about military action. They may be in possession of facts not known to others and it is they who bear the burden of decision-making. The just war tradition exists above all to serve them. I think Weigel would agree with the late Professor Paul Ramsey that the role of Christian leaders is to give ?decision- and action-orientated analysis? their role is to describe and analyse proposed courses of action while recognising that it is not they but others who have to make the decisions and take responsibility for doing so. This is a salutary point which Christian leaders should always bear in mind.

Nevertheless, in a democratic society when the political and military facts are as well known to the public as they are to government (as is the case with Saddam Hussein?s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction), the usual demarcation of roles cannot preclude a judgement about possible courses of action if it seems clear to Christian leaders that the criteria are not being met. Such judgements do not have, and should not be claimed to have, the authority of the just war criteria themselves or the Churches? exposition of these in relation to the circumstances in question. Nevertheless, if it seems clear to many church leaders, as it does today, that just war criteria are not fully met, then there may be a duty to say so, albeit with what Weigel calls ?a measure of political modesty?.

Secondly, he argues that defence against aggression does not require the authority of the Security Council of the UN. It may be prudent to seek it, but it is not for him ?a moral imperative?. Here Weigel does, I think, miss the whole point of the first criterion of the tradition about lawful authority. Lawful authority is the highest authority that is available to us. For the past few hundred years it has been the nation state which has had to act as judge and jury in its own cause, but today we have not just an aspiration towards but a real achievement in the United Nations as an arbiter of national disputes and as an authority that can uphold international law. Of course, under the UN charter states retain the right of self defence. But an attack on Iraq by the United States could not easily be put in that category. If such an attack is justified ? in the name of international order ? then it requires a clear, specific resolution of the Security Council. Only in this way can we begin to believe that such an attack is truly in the interests of international order and not just an expression of the national interest of a particular state.

Weigel has asked, in criticism of the Security Council of the UN:

What kind of moral logic is it to claim that the US government might assuage the interests of the French Foreign Ministry and the strategic aims of the repressive Chinese government ? both of which are in full play in the Security Council ? in order to gain international moral authority for the war against terrorism and the defence of world order against outlaw states with weapons of mass destruction?

Of course, the Security Council does not operate in the stratosphere above the familiar play of politics and national interest. But it is precisely that interplay and clash of national interests that can help give an international as opposed to a purely national authority to any decisions that are made.

Thirdly, Weigel is critical of the American Catholic bishops? understanding of the just war tradition as based on a ?presumption against violence?. Instead, he argues that the starting point is the responsibility of public authorities to defend peace and this sometimes necessitates the use of force. But a balanced reading of the Christian tradition suggests that these two positions are not alternatives. They go together. It is indeed the role of public authorities both nationally and now, through the UN, internationally, to maintain peace, order and justice (pax-ordo-iustitia), but the just war tradition makes it quite clear that force must only be used as a last resort when all avenues for resolving the dispute by peaceful means have been tried and exhausted. Diplomacy and peaceful persuasion must be pushed right to the limit. In short, there is indeed a presumption against violence.

Weigel?s own understanding of last resort stretches the understanding of the concept beyond the point where it has any real meaning. He criticises the view that last resort requires that a series of ?non-military options (legal, diplomatic, economic, etc.) must be serially exhausted before the criterion of ?last resort? is satisfied?. Instead, he suggests that ?last resort? can refer to military action without having gone through this prior process, if military action seems the only appropriate response to a regime which is building up weapons of mass destruction. But we can only legitimately make a judgement that force is the only option if other options have been tried and found wanting.

Fourthly, Weigel suggests that we do not need to wait until an attack against us is under way before responding. If the enemy is like Iraq, he suggests, then ?going first? may be ?morally obligatory?. It may indeed be so, in principle. But there is no evidence that Iraq is a serious and imminent threat. A policy of deterrence and containment has worked for the past 10 years, albeit at great cost to the ordinary people of Iraq. What has suddenly changed that justifies us in stepping over the awesome threshold of war with all its unpredictable consequences and certain loss of innocent life? Weigel argues:

It makes little moral sense to suggest that the United States must wait until a North Korea or Iraq or Iran actually launches a ballistic missile tipped with a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction before we can legitimately do something about it. Can we not say that, in the hands of certain kinds of states, their mere possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes an aggression ? or, at the very least, an aggression-waiting-to-happen? The ?regime factor? is crucial in the moral analysis.

This is a highly dangerous idea, not least because the United States is in possession of more weapons of mass destruction than any other country. Americans see some of those other countries as potential aggressors, and conclude that this justifies pre-emptive war against them. But by the same reasoning, those countries, if they for their part see the United States as a potential aggressor, would be justified in taking pre-emptive action against it. In making this point, I do not, of course, imply that there is a moral equivalence between a democratic country like the United States and a dictatorship like Iraq. But I do say that Weigel?s view opens a Pandora?s box.

George Weigel is to be fully supported in his continuing championing of the just war tradition as an essential moral dimension for statecraft in the modern world. He stands within the sound tradition of James Turner Johnson and Paul Ramsey. He is also right not to see the just war tradition as wooden and unchanging. What he lacks, however, is any sense of how states deceive themselves and in particular how those who claim the highest moral ground are most likely to suffer from illusions about their own righteousness. There is little awareness in Weigel?s writings that in these conflicts American interests might be involved and those interests are not necessarily coterminous with the interests of international order.

It is true, as already stated, that it is public authorities who have to make the decision, and the just war criteria exist to help them. The Church can try to explicate that tradition in relation to current circumstances in such a way that the issues are clearly seen in a moral and not simply a political perspective. But in a democratic society the Church may sometimes also need to make a judgement ? one which is in principle no better and no worse than that of the politicians ? about whether the criteria appear to be met. Roman Catholic and Anglican bishops both in the United States and Great Britain are saying that at the moment they are not.

George Weigel?s views are set out in the Catholic University Law Review from the Columbus School of Law, spring 2002; his Simon Lecture, ?Moral Clarity in a Time of War? is at www.eppc.org and was summed up by him in the Daily Telegraph of 18 November 2002.

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