From the editor’s desk

The nuclear opt-out

Demonstrations on the streets of Tehran, growing tensions between North and South on the Korean peninsula, and a policy shift by the leader of Britain's Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, have one thread in common - they are all related to nuclear proliferation. The issue is near the top of the United Nations' agenda of threats to world peace, and shows little sign of dropping down it. The power struggle in Iran after the contested presidential election is primarily about internal liberalisation and dismay at the antics of the irrational incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But the outside world is more concerned with Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons technology, coupled with President Ahmadinejad's contempt for the West and his attacks on Israel's right to exist.  

Nuclear war between Iran and Israel is a nightmare. So is nuclear war between North and South Korea, the latter being under America's nuclear umbrella. Desolation if not obliteration would threaten all parties involved, with a high risk of escalation as outside powers took sides. If British politicians believed that Britain's continued possession of the Trident nuclear weapons system was a useful factor in damping down those potential conflicts, it would be irresponsible of them to urge its abandonment, whatever the cost of keeping it. But that is not part of the Lib. Dem. argument. Mr Clegg simply declares that the £20 billion cost of replacing Trident is more than the country can afford, so it should be withdrawn after 2020 when it becomes obsolete. But that judgement pre­supposes a cost-benefit analysis in terms of nuclear proliferation and world peace, not simply with reference to the need to rein in post-recession public spending. So his broad conclusion is probably right, but his argument is flawed. If the absence of Britain's Trident system after 2020 would make no difference to world stability then, it would make no difference now. The logic of his policy is to cancel Trident forthwith. 

Trident is vastly more sophisticated than anything dreamed of in the Middle East or south-east Asia. It involves not only multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, but virtually undetectable launch platforms in the form of nuclear submarines. Those are costly cold war requirements, with little relevance at a time when the major threat to national security comes from terrorist networks like al-Quaida. Even in the Conservative Party there are those asking whether Britain could remain a nuclear power with a cheaper system. But the real problem, as much with Britain as with Iran and North Korea, is that the possession of nuclear weapons is seen as a badge of membership of an elite group of nations that have to be treated with more respect because they are, frankly, dangerous to others. One could almost say Mr Ahmadinejad wants a nuclear bomb to stop the rest of the world treating him as ridiculous; or North Korea to hide the fact that it is one of the world's most dysfunctional states. In Britain's case the real fear is of national insignificance, for a former centre of a large empire. Britain's hanging on to Trident for all the wrong reasons, therefore, is on balance an encouragement to nuclear proliferation rather than a factor countering it. It promotes "the bomb" as the answer to national insecurity and lack of self-confidence. A nation with decent self-respect should not need it.