You will have read about the provisions of this bill to permit the creation of animal/human hybrids, to increase the use of human embryos in stem-cell research, to remove the "need for a father" from law and birth certificates. It may well also be used to change the laws on abortion.

Beyond the details of the research which is to be permitted, there are a number of underlying trends, increasingly common in our public discourse, which characterise this bill and debate about it.

One is the selective use of evidence. We hear consistently the claims that the type of embryo experimentation being permitted by the bill holds great promise for future cures of illness like cystic fibrosis and MS. The evidence for this is so far sparse. Very little progress has been made through embryonic stem-cell research. In contrast, work with adult stem cells is showing far better results. All the published research points in this direction, even in the specific task of finding cures for cystic fibrosis. Yet we hear little about it. What is to be lost in facing these facts? They actually indicate the pathways of successful research to which there are no ethical objections.

But our objections to the bill are ethical. We are not trying to protect God, but ourselves and our society. Some of the things the bill proposes are wrong and will do harm.

This bill makes clear the ways in which scientists are researching into every aspect of human reproduction. It makes clear the ways in which the law of this land is now bearing down on the fundamental patterns of relationships within the family and society.

This bill permits the commercialisation of aspects of human birth: the donation of its fundamental elements and the use of surrogates. Research is opening up for us the possibility of engineered human birth away from a natural mother. Because we can do these things, does it mean that we should? Are they really for our common good?

The conception of a child can never simply be a question of the rights of adults. It is also and always a matter of the rights of that new life, that child. These rights, too, must be respected. The provisions in this bill which permit, in certain circumstances, the need of a child for a father to be set aside neglect those rights. And the proposal that, with the full support of the law, reference to the child's biological father may be omitted from the record of birth is to burden a child with the weight of a lie from the first moments of life. That is a dereliction of our duty. Its repercussions will be felt in years to come.

This bill proposes ... a diminishment of the practical respect shown to human life in its beginnings, a restructuring of crucial patterns of parenting. Members of Parliament must think carefully about this bill and pay attention to the instinctive recoil that many feel about some of its proposals. There is wisdom in this repugnance. We must make our own thoughts and conviction clear.